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 Rudolf Otto first made himself known to me in the religion and ritual scholar Catherine 
Bell’s book Rituals. The book was part of the curriculum professor Bruce Chilton put together 
for Sacred Pursuits, my college’s required theory and methods course for religion majors. If you 
have read Bell’s book, you may be thinking “Bell talked about Otto?” It’s only a few sentences 
but it was enough. What can I say, when you find your theologian, you find your theologian.  
 Since my love for Otto was nearly instant, when professor Bruce Chilton asked us to do a 
presentation about a theorist or theologian we had encountered in the class, I, of course, chose 
Otto. I recall my presentation as being very elaborate. I was so excited to present him to the 
class. I am just as excited to present him to you here.  
 I gave that presentation my sophomore year. Through many conversations and my 
unquestionable interest, Otto became a no-brainer for the topic of my senior project. In fact, 
when my previous advisor, Kristin Scheible, who is a South Asian Religious scholar, matched 
my level of excitement about Otto by telling me her dog was named after him, it was official.  
 I’ve been working with Otto for two years now and I’m convinced that my love for and 
excitement about him will never cease. But I would be lying if I said my relationship to Otto has 
been all love and excitement. I have encountered extreme difficulties and at times, utter 
frustration. Especially in writing this work. I have thought myself in circles, wrote brainless 
sentences and gone down very distracting paths. These were the times I felt extremely grateful to 
have the incredible people in my life that I do: I visited one of my advisor, Tehseen Thaver’s 
office nearly every week this past fall term. She clearly and succinctly laid out what my project 
could and could not look like. So many times when I thought I had a great idea, she re-taught me 
 what being prescriptive meant. From these many lessons I was able to figure out an acceptable, 
concrete project approach.  
 Just as many times as I visited Tehseen’s office, I also visited Dorothy Albertini’s office. 
She is one of the first Bard faculty members I met freshman year and is, hands down, the most 
patient human being on the planet. She held me accountable to my work, handcrafted a calendar 
as a tool of reference, and never failed to check in to make sure everything was going okay.  
 Another former advisor, Wyatt Mason, has been a grounding presence. There were times 
when I had no belief in my writing ability and felt the project would never get done. Calmly and 
confidently, Wyatt reassured me of my abilities and my sanity.  
 I have current senior project advisor, Bruce Chilton, to thank not only for introducing me 
to Otto but also for steering me along the way ever since. His open-mindedness regarding my 
many ideas and impeccable reference recommendations gave me the freedom and resources I 
needed to shape this project. He will tell you, as I am now, that it took until the very end for it to 
really take shape. Despite that, he never had any doubt that it would come into fruition.  
 One of my assistant soccer coaches, James Rodewald, and good friend, Siira Rieschl, 
graciously extended their workdays to proof this project. There is always fear in handing 
someone else your writing, however, they both treated my work with respect and sincere 
curiosity. This project’s clarity, which is the clearest writing of mine to date, I credit not only to 
the attention I’ve given to writing in my 4 years at Bard, but also to James and Siira’s corrections 
and comments. 
 The girls I babysit, Isabella and Fiona Kelly, have proven to be my biggest cheerleaders. 
They always ask how senior project was going and are planning to celebrate with me upon 
 completion. Their love of life and ability to bring me to gut wrenching laughter also served as 
constant stress relief.  Honestly, I couldn’t have done this without them.  
 Outside of the people in my life I have established relationships with, there are a few 
people I have met in working on this project who have been of great help intellectually. The first 
is a Vassar College philosophy professor, Jennifer Church. Professor Church gave a guest lecture 
at Bard called “The Significance of Ambivalence.” Before attending the lecture, I was stuck on 
how to treat an aspect of Otto’s dichotomies. Although her lecture was not entirely relevant to 
this project, her thoughts on ambivalence helped me move past an intellectual hurdle.  
Similarly, Matthew Mutter, a Bard Literature professor, presented the introduction of his 
book Restless Secularism, soon to be published, regarding secularity in modern literature. The 
introduction is entitled, “Modernist Secularism and Its Discontents.” At a time when I had been 
working really closely on Otto’s ideas, Professor Mutter’s discussion helped me contextualize 
Otto’s approach to religion on a bigger scale.  
Lastly, while attending a conference at Vanderbilt Divinity School, I met a Ph.D. student 
named Leonard, who, in casual conversation, challenged the idea of an intersection with 
constellation. When I asked him what he meant by this, he explained that he was challenging 
intersection’s assumption of a onetime connection with constellation’s constant connection. The 
encounter changed my thinking in more ways than relate to this project.  
 To all those I have named, especially Catherine Bell for initiating my relationship with 
Otto, and Otto, whose work I hope to do justice, thank you so, so much. It is my hope that this 
project exists not only as a strong reflection of everything I have learned from everyone who has 
helped me along my way, but also of the invaluable education I have received in my time at 
Bard.  
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1 
Introduction – The “Holy”: A Brief Overview 
“‘Holiness’ – ‘the holy’ – is a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the 
sphere of religion.”1 This “peculiarity to the sphere of religion” emerges out of the German 
“religious philosopher”2 Rudolf Otto’s most renowned book, The Idea of the Holy. Which is the 
primary source for this work as a whole.  
It will be helpful to have a sense of what the holy is before diving deeper into its 
complexities. In Otto’s definition, the holy serves as something between a deity and the sublime. 
The complexity of the holy resides, in part, in its dichotomy: “the holy in the fullest sense of the 
word is a combined, complex category, the combining elements being its rational and non-
rational components.”3 The holy is simultaneously rational and non-rational. The holy is not a 
deity because deity potentially implies a plurality and is also associated with idolatry. The holy is 
singular and the non-rational aspect of the holy does not accept a physical presence as in 
idolatry. The holy is also not the same as the sublime because the sublime is completely other. 
The rational side of the holy contradicts this. Although partly something other, the holy has 
intellectually graspable attributes. So, think of the holy loosely as a divine presence, but let your 
mind be open to new interpretations of what a divine presence can mean, and that will approach 
Otto’s meaning.  
Alongside this open-ended idea of a divine presence, Otto’s books The Philosophy of 
Religion: Based on Kant and Fries and Naturalism and Religion will help guide our reading of 
the holy. They are not meant to distract from our focus, but, rather, to help us better inform the 
                                                        
1 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the 
Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1958), 5. 
2 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, xi. 
3 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 112. 
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idea of the holy. These two works precede the primary source and are the basis for Otto’s idea of 
the holy. In the forward to The Idea of the Holy, Otto expresses the importance of these two 
works to his ideas. 
Before I venture upon this field of inquiry I spent many years of study upon the 
rational aspect of that supreme Reality we call ‘God’, and the results of my work 
are contained in my books, Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht [Naturalism 
and Religion] and Die Kant-Friesische Religions-Philosophie [The Philosophy of 
Religion: Based on Kant and Fries]. And I feel that no one ought to concern 
himself with the ‘Numen ineffible’ who has not already devoted assiduous and 
serious study to the ‘Ratio aeterna’ [eternal Reason].4 
We must be familiar with both works before attempting to understand the holy. The Philosophy 
of Religion is an elaboration on how Fries’s idea of the sublime heals the criticisms against 
Kant’s idea of pure and practical reason. It is useful in our discussion of Otto’s holy to look at 
how Otto connects with Fries and Kant because The Idea of the Holy parallels the Fries and Kant 
pairing. The only difference is that Otto’s holy replaces Fries’s Ahnung.  
Ahnung is defined in the translator’s notes at the beginning of The Philosophy of 
Religion: 
Fries understands by Ahnung (Ahnudung) a conviction, originating in the 
feelings, without any definite conception, of the reality of the supra-sensual, 
which gives us a reflection of the real existence of things in their phenomena, and 
brings us to their external meaning and purposeful connection, in Nature’s 
sublimity and beauty  
This is belief based on feelings. A reality based on feelings as opposed to the rational. Otto’s 
holy and Fries’s sublime have this non-rational aspect in common. This idea of Fries’s will be 
referred to later on in this introduction.  
Naturalism and Religion, on the other hand, is a book that wrestles with the relationship 
between naturalism and religion. At the same time that Otto is trying to establish that the two 
have a relationship, he is also presenting naturalism’s problematic reductionist tendency, which 
                                                        
4 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, Forward. 
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leaves no room for religion. It is important to understand this, and will become even more so 
later on, because it situates and embellishes the ego. This work is not constructive to this 
introduction; however, it will be of use later on.  
Otto begins The Idea of the Holy speaking to the rational side of the holy: “An object that 
can thus be thought conceptually may be termed rational.”5 This may seem like a very broad 
definition of rational, but it becomes critical to the understanding of the holy. The object that can 
be thought of conceptually within Otto’s rational aspect of the holy is the divine presence.6  
It is essential to every theistic conception of God, and most of all the Christian, 
that it distinguishes and precisely characterizes deity by the attributes spirit, 
reason, purpose, good will, supreme power, unity, [and] selfhood.7  
All of these attributes can be “grasped by the intellect.”8 The divine presence, in this case deity, 
has attributes that can be conceptualized. “The nature of deity described in the attributes above 
mentioned is, then a rational nature; and a religion which recognizes and maintains such a view 
of God is in so far a ‘rational’ religion.”9 A religion whose divine presence encompasses these 
graspable attributes is considered  “rational.” Otto makes it clear that every religion must meet 
this requirement within his approach. “Only on such terms is belief possible in contrast to mere 
feeling.”10 The attributes designated to the divine presence are crucial for Otto. They make a 
religion “rational” and therefore enable belief. 
                                                        
5 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1. 
6 Otto uses the term deity here, but nowhere else in his work does he use holy in the same light as 
deity. I will consistently use “divine presence” throughout this work no matter what term Otto 
uses. Otto’s relational words will continue to change throughout.  
7 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1. 
8 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1. 
9 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1. 
10 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1. 
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However, the holy is not simply the rational, for “we have to be on our guard against 
error which would lead to a wrong and one-sided interpretation of religion.”11 A one-sided view 
is one where “the essence of [the] deity can be given completely and exhaustively in such 
‘rational’ attributions”12 A divine presence whose essence is mistaken as its “rational” attributes 
is one-sided.  
This one-sided critique speaks directly to the thinkers of the 19th century. The Idea of the 
Holy was published in German in 1917 and later published in English in 1923.13 Otto was 
entering the theological conversation at a time when the rational aspect of religion was heavily 
privileged. Although Ivan Strenski’s entry about Otto in his book Understanding Theories of 
Religion classifies Otto as a phenomenologist, I feel that he does a very good job informing the 
readers about whom Otto was beyond that designation. For this reason, I will use Strenski’s 
situation of Otto in history: 
[Otto] was deeply involved in overturning prevailing nineteenth-century liberal 
Protestant conceptions of religion, such as Robertson Smith’s – namely that 
religion was really morality. But Robertson Smith was not alone among our 
classic theorists in making this identification of religion and morality. Weber, 
Freud, and Durkheim too held this position at one time or another. Otto, however, 
felt this rather “domesticated” religion by making it altogether too social and 
rational. Put otherwise, the identification of religion with morality reduced 
religion to something other than it was.14 
The same problem Otto has with the rational idea of the 19th-century is the problem I briefly 
mentioned in introducing Naturalism and Religion, namely, the problem of reducing. Reducing 
leads to a one-sided view of something. In this case, Otto sees 19th century thinkers to be 
reducing religion to rationale. Otto is not saying that these thinkers are completely wrong; after 
                                                        
11 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1. 
12  Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1-2. 
13 Bernard E. Meland, "Rudolf Otto," in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, last modified 
December 19, 2014, accessed April 27, 2016, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Rudolf-Otto 
14 Ivan Strenski, Understanding Theories of Religion: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Chichester, West 
Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 86, digital file. 
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all, he incorporates the rational into his idea of the holy. However, the rational attributes only 
make up an aspect of the divine presence. He is saying that the ideas are incomplete.  
Otto proposes a dichotomy as a solution to the reduction of one-sidedness. We get a 
better sense what this means when he says, “For so far are these ‘rational’ attributes from 
exhausting the idea of deity, that they in fact imply a non-rational supra-natural subject of which 
they are predicates.”15 For him, there is a distinction between attributes and essence. He argues 
that the essence of the divine presence is not rational, only the attributes, which are a distinction 
of the essence, are rational. Further, the “rational” attributes are so miniscule in relation to the 
idea of a divine presence that they cannot possibly be all the divine presence is comprised of. 
“Rational” attributes simply predicate the non-rational subject of the divine presence.  
So, what is the non-rational aspect of the holy and how does it exist in relation to the 
rational in order make up the whole? “It will be our endeavor to suggest this unnamed Something 
to the reader as far as we may, so that he may himself feel it.”16 At the onset, the non-rational is 
presented as a “Something” that is felt and unnamed. This Something is “‘the holy’ minus its 
moral factor or ‘moment,’ and … minus its ‘rational’ aspect altogether.”17 This non-rational 
Something is later explained as religious feelings that Otto names “mysterium tremendum” and 
“creature consciousness.” These feelings regard the interaction with what Otto calls the numen. 
Otto renames the non-rational aspect of the holy numen in order to accurately talk about 
the non-rational in isolation. The word “holy,” within the Bible, is translated from “the Hebrew 
qadôsh, to which the Greek äyios and the Latin sanctus.”18 The problem Otto has with these 
translations is that “all three languages connote, as part of their meaning, good, absolute 
                                                        
15 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 2. 
16 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6. 
17 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6. 
18 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6. 
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goodness.”19 This is a problem because Otto sees this isolated, non-rational aspect of the “holy 
above and beyond the meaning of goodness.”20 Otto adopts the Latin word “numen” to mean the 
divine presence and expands upon the word to make numinous. “This [numinous] mental state is 
perfectly sui generis [unique] and irreducible to any other; and therefore, like every absolutely 
primary and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly 
defined.”21 The numen is the divine presence and the numinous is the mental state evoked by the 
numen. The numinous is the experience of the numen. 
Otto goes into great detail about religious feeling and the numen and numinous, however 
that detail will be explored in chapter 1. For now, what is useful to us is that the non-rational 
exists as something minus the rational element of the holy. It is this idea that establishes Otto’s 
lasting impact on the conversation regarding the approach to theorizing religion. Although he 
was not the first to speak of religious experience, he was the first to establish an approach to 
theorizing religion that included an experiential aspect totally outside of the rational. Where 
others included experience their rational ideas, Otto included the rational in his experiential idea.  
Having identified the aspects of Otto’s dichotomy, rational and non-rational, we must 
now come to an understanding of how it functions. It is useful to first look at Otto’s book The 
Philosophy of Religion: Based on Kant and Fries. In The Philosophy of Religion, Otto shows 
“the fundamental importance of certain elements of the philosopher Fries, derived from Kant and 
given a new orientation, with regard to the possibility of a new Philosophy of Religion.”22 The 
                                                        
19 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6. 
20 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6. 
21 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 7. 
22 Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion: Based on Kant and Fries, trans. E. B. Dicker 
(London: Williams and Norgate, 1931), 9. 
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most relevant elements of Kant and Fries for understanding Otto’s holy are Kant’s idea of pure 
reason and his idea of critique of judgment, and Fries’s Ahnung.  
In both The Philosophy of Religion and The Idea of the Holy, the underlying question 
Otto is aiming to answer is: what is the ontological proof of a divine presence? Also in both, the 
question is answered in the exact same manner: through the idea of a priori knowledge. Again 
the difference between the two books is Fries’s sublime and Otto’s holy. Because Otto elaborates 
upon a priori further in The Philosophy of Religion, I will turn to it for clarification about a 
priori.  
In regard to the holy, the rational and non-rational unite as “a purely a priori category.”23 
The question that arises now is: What does Otto mean by a priori? Because Otto assumes the 
reader to be familiar with his previous works, he does not describe the a priori at length within 
The Idea of the Holy. In chapter 2, section 2, of The Philosophy of Religion, “Religious Truth as 
Necessary Truth,” Otto explains the a priori.  
This quote begins just after Otto introduces the reader to Fries’s ideas in a continuous 
series of quotes. Otto presents two conceptions of religion and ethics, historico-empiric truth and 
necessary truth.  
The contrast between historico-empiric truth and necessary truth is obviously in 
total agreement with the contrast between mere being-taught and finding-out-for-
oneself (being inwardly convinced). That in religion everything depends on the 
latter is really self-evident to this way of thinking. – From Descartes to Spinoza, 
Leibnitz, Lessing, this conviction always breaks through. But, to speak generally, 
it is a part of that extremely consistent and coherent basis of a general conception 
which, in spite of the variety in its schools of thought, gives the “Aufklärung” its 
unity. And in fact it is the sense of the fruitless but ever-renewed efforts of that 
age towards an “ontological proof of God,” i.e. an individual ascertainment of 
God without an “empiric taint,” purely a priori and solely from the means at the 
disposal of the reasoning mind itself. Behind this as a driving force there is the 
                                                        
23 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 112. 
  
8 
just sentiment that the loftiest ideas of the reasoning mind and this truth cannot 
and must not in the last resort be founded on anything external and “accidental.”24 
Otto speaks to historico-empiric truth as assuming necessary truth. This is an entry point to Fries 
because his “Aufklärung” grounds the idea of religion as a necessary truth. It is here where we 
come to terms with a priori. We come to understand a priori in contrast to the empirical: 
knowledge versus experience. The a priori enables one to “find-out-for-oneself,” where 
historical experience is taught. Although they are being contrasted, it does not mean that one is 
irrelevant. The argument is that religious truth, which is necessary truth, cannot be established 
from experience. Others cannot teach us.  
Otto is able to start here because he is working off the ideas of other thinkers: “And in 
fact it is the sense of the fruitless but ever-renewed efforts of that age towards an ‘ontological 
proof of God’”25 The thinkers Otto named, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Lessing, are ones 
who pushed us toward the idea that there is existing proof of God. They have pushed us there, 
but they assume religion as a necessary truth. Otto is arguing that they have pushed us there but 
not proven the proof to be true.  
This is where Otto’s holy and Fries’s Ahnung come in. Otto uses a priori as the 
ontological proof of God. The ontological proof of God lies in the a priori, an accessible 
knowledge we can all obtain. For Fries, the intuitive knowledge we obtain is Ahnung, the feeling 
of the sublime. But for Otto, the a priori is the holy. We all obtain the knowledge of the rational 
and non-rational aspects of the holy. We know the attributes of the deity and we know the numen 
and the numinous.  
                                                        
24 Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, 34. 
25 Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, 34. 
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Even though we all have a priori knowledge, that doesn’t mean that knowledge is readily 
available to us. This is why Otto shies away from using the term “innate.” Before elaborating 
upon the numen in The Idea of the Holy, Otto proclaims: 
The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious 
experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness. 
Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is 
requested to read no farther.26 
Otto is admitting that a priori knowledge is not readily available. That some may not have 
realized the a priori knowledge of the holy yet. Read literally, this quote seems rather harsh and 
is contradictory to Otto’s whole idea of the holy. Otto is trying to convince us that we all have a 
priori knowledge of the holy, but read literally, he only wants to explain it to those who have 
already realized this knowledge.  This reading makes an all-inclusive idea seemingly exclusive. 
I want to challenge the literal reading of this quote. We have already established that 
some have yet to experience the holy. I suggest we read this quote as if it were a kind of 
advertising. Otto is telling those who have not yet experienced the holy to put the book down in 
an effort to make them more curious about what it is they are missing. After all, the majority of 
The Idea of the Holy is an elaboration and argument for the non-rational side of the holy, the side 
that evokes a unique mental state within us.  
What do I mean by us? Who are we within Otto’s idea of the holy? Are we human? As 
we will come to find out in chapter 1, when I elaborate upon the non-rational creature 
consciousness feeling, Otto refers to humans as creatures. Chapter 2 will expand on this idea and 
speak to what the creature is made up of: “the creature – soul and spirit.”27  
                                                        
26 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 8. 
27 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 194. 
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One distinctive aspect of Otto’s idea of the holy in relation to the creature is individuality. 
The historico-empiric truth, which Otto earlier contrasted with the a priori in The Philosophy of 
Religion, reveals its importance here.  
There is only one way to help another to an understanding of it [the numen]. He 
must be guided and led on by consideration and discussion of the matter through 
the ways of his own mind, until he reaches the point at which ‘the numinous’ in 
him perforce begins to stir.28 
The holy is a priori, it is founded on the knowledge imbedded within us from the start; however, 
our experiences do help guide us. Ultimately, we are the only ones who can evoke the a priori 
knowledge of the holy within ourselves. Fries and Otto differ here. Fries’s Ahnung can be shared, 
Otto’s holy cannot. For Otto, the awakening process is subjective, dependent upon an individual 
creature though the holy is objective. Otto’s idea of subjectivity and individuality will be 
addressed in chapter 2.  
 From what we have discussed, we know that Otto’s holy is a divine presence creatures 
have a priori knowledge of. Though this knowledge is embedded within us, it is not readily 
available. This is where Otto’s dichotomy comes into play. The non-rational aspect of the holy, 
the numen/numinous, is an awakening to the a priori knowledge of the holy. We come to the 
awakening of the non-rational in the ways of our own minds. Others simply help guide us. The 
feeling of the holy that arises within the mind is instantly made sense of because of its a priori 
existence. Preceding this feeling/awakening is the a priori knowledge of the rational. The 
rational attributes of the divine presence, which enable belief and deem a religion “rational,” 
make up the rational side of the holy. Upon realizing the feeling of the holy, our mind becomes 
aware of the attributes of the divine presence and is able to make sense of our belief. Otto’s holy 
                                                        
28  Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 7. 
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exists as the explanation of the ontological proof of God so many thinkers before Otto pushed 
toward. 
While expanding on the ideas introduced here, the remaining chapters will present and 
problematize different dichotomies that exist within the idea of the holy. The dichotomies I am 
choosing to present are rational and non-rational, the main dichotomy of the holy, soul and spirit, 
which make up the dichotomy of the self, and lastly, body and mind, the dichotomy regarding 
the localization of the self. Although Otto’s work is not limited to these three dichotomies, I feel 
that they are the most crucial to treat. The problems relating to each dichotomy will be argued 
through inconsistencies in Otto’s ideas. More specifically, I will argue for a redefinition of a 
priori to exclude the rational, argue that the creature’s individuality belongs to the spirit, and that 
the self be localized in the body.  
Before beginning, it is important to note why I have chosen to center my work on Otto 
and his Idea of the Holy. I feel that Otto has become a footnote in modern academia. He is 
written about as though he is not important enough to elaborate upon, yet is important enough to 
mention. When he is treated as more than a footnote, the mistreatment still occurs. His ideas are 
picked up and proven flawed. It is as if scholars are patting him on the back saying, “This is 
interesting but doesn’t really work.”  
An example is Professor of Jewish Theology Melissa Raphael’s “Constructivism and 
Numinous Experience.” Raphael’s piece argues Otto’s holy as “a phenomenological analysis of 
(male) reactions to an unconceptualized numinous object.”29 In arguing that Otto’s approach to 
theorizing religion is gendered, her conclusion becomes “that the numinous experience is 
                                                        
29 Melissa Raphael, "Feminism, Constructivism and Numinous Experience," Religious Studies 
30, no. 4 (December 1994): 516, accessed April 17, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20000118. 
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unlikely to be (and still less to remain) the comprehensive core of both men and women.”30 She 
is leaving Otto in shambles.31 
Scholars who take up Otto are absolutely right that his ideas are flawed. In fact, Raphael 
raises legitimate issues with Otto, but I believe she hasn’t given Otto enough attention. My 
approach is different from those who mistreat him because I believe Otto’s problems can be 
treated. I do not see Otto as the problem. I view Otto’s problem, which is outside the scope of 
this project, as a perpetuation of what Eve Browning Cole names the gender binary. 
In conclusion, I hope that by paying due attention to Otto’s work that I bring an 
awareness and further appreciation to his idea. I hope Otto and his idea of the holy become 
treated more than a footnote. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
30 Raphael, "Feminism, Constructivism and Numinous," 526. 
31 I am aware that Raphael went on to write a book about Otto’s significance years after this 
piece, however, I’m speaking to this article in order to exemplify how many scholars treat him. 
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Chapter 1 – The Awakening: Redefining Otto’s a priori 
Having come to an understanding of the holy in the introduction, we will now turn to the 
first dichotomy, rational and non-rational. The elements of the non-rational that were not fully 
explored last chapter will be explained. Those elements deal with religious feeling and are 
defined by Otto as “creature consciousness” and mysterium tremendum. After explaining Otto’s 
definition of both, I will argue that the mysterium tremendum represents an awakening. If we 
view mysterium tremendum as an awakening, another argument emerges: that Otto’s rational 
aspect of the holy should not be considered a priori. Arguing the rational outside of a priori is 
ultimately an argument against Otto’s definition of a priori.  
The first religious feeling of the non-rational part of Otto’s holy I will address is creature 
consciousness. We will come to know it as a religious feeling of nothingness evoked by a divine 
presence. Because Otto uses German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher’s “feeling of 
dependence,” which, until defined later, can be thought of as a dependence upon God, as a base 
for his definition of creature consciousness, Schleiermacher’s ideas must first be understood. 
Schleiermacher appears in Otto’s Philosophy of Religion. Although that book is about 
Kant and Fries, Schleiermacher is introduced alongside Fries and continues to make appearances 
throughout the book. From Otto’s treatment of Schleiermacher in The Philosophy of Religion, we 
can better understand how Otto is using Schleiermacher’s idea.  
 On the first page of the introduction in The Philosophy of Religion, Otto takes up and 
clarifies how he views Fries and Schleiermacher’s relationship. 
Historians of the philosophy of religion have pointed out a certain affinity 
between Fries and Schleiermacher in their treatment of the theory of religious 
“feeling,” but they have assumed that Schleiermacher’s was the more original and 
comprehensive intellect. Really, however, in the philosophy of religion, the points 
of contact between Fries and Schleiermacher are less important than their points 
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of difference; and where their views agree, Fries is quite original and closer study 
proves him to be superior in comprehensiveness, thoroughness and solidity.32 
Otto acknowledges that both Fries and Schleiermacher present similar philosophies of religion. 
Throughout The Philosophy of Religion, Naturalism and Religion, and The Idea of the Holy Otto 
uncovers and makes use of Fries and Schleiermacher’s differences. However, the way Otto treats 
these differences often confuses their importance. 
In The Philosophy of Religion, as exemplified in the block quote above, Otto claims 
Schleiermacher’s ideas are superior to Fries’s. He even goes on to call Schleiermacher’s feeling 
of dependence “a very one-sided and inadequate description of religious feeling, which in Fries 
has found a much more varied and precise development.”33 Although Otto claims Fries is 
superior in “comprehensiveness, thoroughness and solidity” and views Schleiermacher’s feeling 
of dependence as one sided, there is a footnote that states, “I have dealt with the relation of Fries 
and Schleiermacher in my Naturalistische and religiöse Weltansicht [Naturalism and Religion], 
but I am now compelled to withdraw my remarks as to Schleiermacher’s superiority to Fries.” 
Otto shows Schleiermacher’s weaknesses but admits he has strengths. This makes it seem like 
Otto is choosing Fries. That Otto is withdrawing his comments because they were wrong. In 
reading all three works, it is clear that this is not the case.  
The Philosophy of Religion and Naturalism and Religion talk about different things. 
Where Naturalism and Religion deals with naturalism’s reductionist tendency and contributes to 
the idea of the holy in establishing the self. As will be addressed in chapter 2. The Philosophy of 
Religion aims to distinguish a relationship between Fries and Kant, which contributes to Otto’s 
definition of a priori. Otto uses Scheiermacher’s feeling of dependence to help clarify the self 
                                                        
32 Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion: Based on Kant and Fries, trans. E. B. Dicker 
(London: Williams and Norgate, 1931), 15. 
33 Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, 23. 
  
15 
and Fries’s Ahnung to help explain a priori. Otto withdraws his remarks from Naturalism and 
Religion within The Philosophy of Religion because of the differing contexts.  
Without reading the other texts, we can still understand that Otto isn’t totally discrediting 
Schleiermacher in The Philosophy of Religion. Just after Otto highlights Schleiermacher’s flaws, 
he tells us to “consider Fries as being outside the ‘philosophy of feeling.’”34 Otto is saying that 
Fries does not speak to religious feelings. At the same time Otto withdraws his remarks about 
Schleiermacher’s superiority, he is also highlighting Schleiermacher’s advantage. If Fries is 
“outside the philosophy of feeling,” Otto implies Schleiermacher is within it. Otto is pointing to 
a difference between Schleiermacher and Fries. What is important about Schleiermacher is his 
feeling of dependence. Fries is superior in The Philosophy of Religion because the feeling of 
dependence is not germane to that work. Otto is using different parts of each thinker’s ideas to 
address different parts of his own. The language of superiority is misleading and only speaks to 
the particular book in which it resides.  
 Otto using parts of Fries and Schleiermacher’s ideas means, as he says, there are parts, 
which he does not agree with. Since Otto uses Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence to inform 
creature consciousness, Otto’s religious feeling, we must understand what is it about 
Schleiermacher’s thinking that Otto finds wanting. In The Idea of the Holy, Otto raises two main 
issues with Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence. The first problem is one sidedness.  
In the first place, the feeling or emotion he [Schleiermacher] has in mind in this 
phrase [feeling of dependence] is in its specific quality not a “feeling of 
dependence” in the “natural” sense of the word. As such, other domains of life 
and other regions of experience than the religious occasion the feeling, as a sense 
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of personal insufficiency and impotence, a consciousness of being determined by 
circumstances and environment.35 
Otto sees Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence as one sided because it is missing context. 
Who is the feeling happening to? When/where does it arise? What specifically is Schleiermacher 
talking about? It’s like someone saying they are hungry and then failing to elaborate further. 
When someone tells someone else they are hungry the immediate question is, “What do you 
want?” There is a lot of frustration in not receiving an answer because we know there is often a 
craving, which coincides. We know there is more to their feeling. In this analogy, Otto would say 
the hunger is not complete. We are only speaking to an aspect of our feeling when we fail to 
elaborate. 
 Otto goes on to say, “What he [Schleiermacher] overlooks is that, in giving the feeling 
the name ‘feeling of dependence’ at all, we are really employing what is no more than a very 
close analogy.”36 If we refer back my analogy of hunger, the word hunger does not describe the 
feeling that takes place. Hunger manifests in ways such as stomach churning and mouth 
watering. Hunger is merely a word for the feeling that occurs, it is not the feeling itself. 
Schleiermacher’s idea becomes an analogy for creature consciousness. 
If Otto is saying Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence does not fit into the natural 
sense of the word, what is the natural sense of “feeling.” Although, in colloquial language feeling 
assumes sensory perception, when Otto speaks to feelings, he isn’t talking about the senses. Otto 
is referring to feelings that arise in the mind: “these feelings [religious feelings] can only arise in 
the mind as accompanying emotions when the category of ‘the numinous’ is called into play.”37 
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The numinous is the divine presence. Not only are feelings of the mind, they are enabled by a 
divine presence. Otto saying Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence is not a feeling “in the 
natural sense of the word” points to Otto’s second critique of Schleiermacher.  
 Before elaborating upon the second issue of Schleiermacher’s “feeling of dependence”, 
let us introduce creature consciousness: “It is the emotion of a creature, submerged and 
overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.”38 
We, the creatures, experience religious feeling in the presence of “that which is supreme above 
all creatures,” or the numen. As a reminder, the numen is the divine presence and the numinous is 
the mental state evoked by the numen. This definition of creature consciousness reinforces the 
inadequacy of Schleiermacher’s “feeling of dependence.” It’s like saying, “the feeling of a 
human, painstakingly consumed by its own stomach churning bodily need for nourishment.” 
Hunger is inadequate, so too is feeling of dependence.  
 This leads into the second problem Otto raises with Schleiermacher’s “feeling of 
dependence,” the issue of how the feeling arises. 
The religious emotion, is merely a category of self-valuation, in the sense of self-
deprecation. According to him [Schleiermacher] the religious emotion would be 
directly and primarily a sort of self-consciousness, a feeling concerning oneself in 
a special, determined relation, viz. one’s dependence. Thus, according to 
Schleiermacher, I can only come upon the very fact of God as a result of an 
inference, that is by reasoning to a cause beyond myself to account for my 
“feeling of dependence.”39 
For Schleiermacher, the feeling of dependence is a state of mind we come to on our own. We 
begin to question what we are missing after we realize we are dependent. The way religious 
feeling arises, then, is out of deductive reasoning. Once we realize we are dependent, it must be 
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deduced that there is a something we are dependent upon. God becomes a solution to the 
problem of dependence.  
 Otto’s creature consciousness is more complex. There is a separation between religious 
feeling and the divine presence. God is not a solution but a presence, which evokes a feeling.  
The “creature-feeling” is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of another 
feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably has 
immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self. Now this object is 
just what we have already spoken of as “the numinous.”40 
Creature consciousness exists only in the presence of the numen. The difference between Otto 
and Schleiermacher here is where the dependence arises. For Schleiermacher, the feeling of 
dependence arises from within us. We infer that we are dependent and, therefore, reason God 
exists. In Otto, the numen is used to enable creature consciousness. The feeling arises out of an 
experience with the numen. For Otto, the divine presence enables the feeling. It is not one we can 
create. The example of encountering a ghost will be used later on, however, it is also helpful 
here. When we encounter a ghost, or believe we encounter something otherworldly, it evokes a 
really strong emotion. This emotion is one that cannot be deduced by our mind alone. Even if we 
had an idea about what it would be like, we could not replicate the emotion by thinking about it. 
We must encounter an otherworldly presence for the emotion to arise. Otto is arguing that 
religious emotions are not deduced, but evoked and experienced. 
We have addressed how Otto distinguishes his ideas from Schleiermacher’s, however it is 
important to note that this relationship is controversial. Scholars Andrew Dole and A.D. Smith 
have opposing opinions about it. Where Dole sees a difference between Otto and 
Schleiermacher’s ideas, Smith does not. Dole’s “Schleiermacher and Otto on religion” argues, 
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“there are important differences between Schleiermacher's and Otto's accounts of religion.”41 
Smith’s piece, “Schleiermacher and Otto on Religion: a reappraisal,” which is a response to 
Dole’s piece, argues, “that there is, in fact, nothing to distinguish between the two thinkers [Otto 
and Schleiermacher] on these issues [those raised by Dole].”42 Ultimately, Smith does not 
believe Otto and Dole give Schleiermacher enough credit and that Schleiermacher has been 
misunderstood.  
For the purpose of future arguments, I am siding with Dole and Otto. Although Smith 
believes Otto and Dole do not give Schleiermacher enough credit, I argue that Otto isn’t using 
Schleiermacher in order to prove the feeling of dependence wrong. Otto is expanding upon and 
altering the feeling of dependence to create creature consciousness. For Otto, Schleiermacher is 
pointing to the right feeling, but hasn’t quite established it. Founding a major idea of holy upon 
the feeling of dependence is not undervaluing.  
Smith’s argument about Otto and Dole misunderstanding Schleiermacher’s ideas does not 
work out either. Dole writes another piece in response to Smith’s, which state,  
My argument was that Otto himself saw Schleiermacher's understanding of 
religion as dangerously “naturalistic” in a sense that opened religion to the charge 
of being, roughly, an illusory human production rather than something grounded 
in the experience of the transcendent. In his “Reappraisal” Smith passes in silence 
over this material; he has subsequently dedicated an independent essay to 
discussing some of Otto's criticisms.43 
The illusory human production Dole speaks to is the same argument that emerged from Otto’s 
second critique regarding how religious feeling arises. Dole pushes Otto’s argument further by 
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deeming Schleiermacher’s understanding “naturalistic.” Otto makes an argument about 
naturalism in his book Naturalism and Religion. Although this idea will be addressed in the 
coming chapters, one of the main problems Otto has with naturalism is its reductionist tendency. 
Dole applies this argument to Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence to say that it is reducing 
religious feeling. I am siding with Dole and Otto in regard to Schleiermacher because as Dole 
says, Smith fails to address Schleiermacher’s lack of grounding in transcendental experience. I 
see the transcendental experience of creature consciousness as Otto’s contribution to 
Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence.  
To review, creature consciousness is the religious feeling, within the mind, of 
nothingness, brought on in the presence of the numen. There is a problem here, though. We 
established in the introduction that the knowledge of the holy, although a priori, is not readily 
accessible. Although we have a priori knowledge of the numen, it does not mean we 
automatically know what the numen is. There has to be a moment when we come to realize the a 
priori knowledge: as Otto would say, an awakening. The creature consciousness assumes that we 
have been awoken.  
Otto introduces another religious feeling, mysterium tremendum. Although he does not 
call mysterium tremendum an awakening, I argue that it is. Not only because creature 
consciousness assumes an awakening, but because the language he uses to describe the feeling 
implies it.  
Let us consider the deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and 
sincerely felt religious emotion. Faith unto salvation, trust, love – all these are 
there. But over and above these is an element which may also on occasion, quite 
apart from them, profoundly affect us and occupy the mind with a wellnigh 
bewildering strength…we are dealing with something for which there is only one 
appropriate expression, “mysterium tremendum.”44 
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Mysterium tremendum is the most essential religious emotion that can be felt. An emotion that is 
greater than love, trust, and belief in deliverance from sin. We are still speaking to religious 
feeling, but a different feeling than creature consciousness. Where creature consciousness 
manifests as an overwhelming feeling of nothingness, mysterium tremendum is the greatest 
feeling of presence of the numen. Otto’s language implying mysterium tremendum as the greatest 
feeling, “deepest,” “fundamental,” and “bewildering strength” is what I feel implies awakening. 
 Since this is such an important aspect of the holy, Otto breaks down mysterium and 
tremendum separately. This attention also contribute to my argument that mysterium tremendum 
is an awakening. Otto starts by explaining three different elements of tremendum: the element of 
“Awefulness,” the element of “Overpoweringness,” and the element of “Energy.” Awefulness 
comes out of Otto’s analysis of the root of tremendum, tremor.  
Tremor is in itself merely the perfectly familiar and “natural” emotion of fear. But 
here the term is taken, aptly enough but still only by analogy, to denote a quite 
specific kind of emotional response, wholly distinct from that of being afraid, 
though it so far resembles it that the analogy of fear may be used to throw light 
upon its nature.45 
Tremor is an emotion associated with fear, but for Otto it is something more; because fear is 
familiar, it is a useful place to start. The tremor Otto tries to describe is both wholly other than 
fear and also accessibly understood through talking about fear.   
 So what is this tremor that is wholly other than fear? “Of modern languages English has 
the words ‘awe,’ ‘aweful,’ which in their deeper and most special sense approximate closely to 
our meaning.”46 Otto uses aweful instead of awesome because of the emotion associated with 
fear. The word “awesome” has positive connotations and does not speak to fear. Otto also 
deliberately uses aweful instead of awful. I see this as Otto reminding us of the context, the holy.  
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But what is Awe? Awe is a response to something unexpected, but also similar to 
admiration or astonishment. Awe and fear feel connected in the element of surprise. When we 
are afraid, it usually is due to a shocking event. If not shocking, unexpected. We cannot expect to 
feel fear or awe toward something before experiencing it. Both are responses to something 
outside of us, therefore outside of our control.  
Another similarity between awe and fear seems to be the intrigue that surprises bring. 
When talking about Awefulness Otto says, “It first begins to stir in the feeling of ‘something 
uncanny,’ ‘eerie,’ or ‘weird.’”47 Mysterium tremendum begins to stir with a feeling of 
unfamiliarity. Otto relates the feeling the unfamiliar stirring to the “shudder” you feel in the 
hearing a ghost story: “That this is so is shown by the potent attraction again and again exercised 
by the element of horror and ‘shudder’ in ghost stories, even among persons of high all-round 
education.”48 This is universal. It doesn’t matter how educated you are, ghost stories will lead 
you to shudder. Everyone experiences things unfamiliar to himself or herself and everyone can 
be surprised.  
Otto uses the example of a ghost story and the fear it creates as an analogy to get at the 
idea of awe he is trying to convey. In the shudder moment of a ghost story, Otto points to the 
moment that catches us off guard. I believe the exact moment of surprise that builds out of 
anticipation is what Otto is trying to point to.  
Another way Otto uses this analogy is our reaction to the shudder. “The awe or ‘dread’ 
may indeed be so overwhelmingly great that it seems to penetrate to the very marrow, making 
the man’s hair bristle and his limbs quake.”49 The moment we become afraid during the telling of 
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a ghost story, we have a physical reaction. We experience horripilation and may even jump out 
of our seats. Awe, like the shudder, is such a deep experience that we have a physical reaction. 
The reaction to the numen is what Otto has already explained as creature consciousness.  
We can see how fear and awe are similar, but how is fear simply an analogy for awe? The 
difference becomes clear in Otto’s examples from the Bible. Otto speaks about the wrath and 
anger of God in the Old Testament. The wrath and anger of God correspond to the fear Otto is 
trying to describe. God’s anger and wrath strike characters dead for things like touching the arc 
of the covenant and also punishes nations of peoples for wrongdoings. This wrath and anger 
portrays a God that is harsh and punishing. As if God has chosen specific people to punish. 
Believing God punishes people would also assume that God rewards people. This would 
invalidate Otto’s universality.  
Otto’s approach to religion is universal because we are all individuals and because we all 
have a priori knowledge of the holy. We have a priori knowledge of the holy because it is 
objective. If God were to reward and punish individuals, God would fail to be objective. For 
Otto, the divine presence’s purpose is not to reward or punish, but to simply awaken religious 
emotion. 
Otto suggests that we look at the anger and wrath in the Old Testament as awe-inspired 
opposed to fear instilling. “‘Wrath’ here is the ‘ideogram’ of a unique emotional moment in 
religious experience.”50 God is not picking people or peoples out to punish. God is revealing the 
possibility of religious experience. We are not supposed to be afraid of the interactions within the 
Old Testament between humans and God, we are supposed to be awe-inspired about their 
existence. It’s not about a punishment or reward, but the possibility of a direct encounter with the 
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divine. Such encounters are awe-filled because they awaken us to the existence of the divine. 
The wrath of God becomes a symbol for the awe regarding religious experience as opposed to 
fear.  
As mentioned earlier, this feeling of mysterium tremendum enables creature 
consciousness. The awe-inspiring shock is meant for us to recognize our nothingness in the 
presence of the supreme.  
It has become mystical awe, and sets free as its accompaniment, reflected in self-
consciousness, that “creature-feeling” that has already been described as the 
feeling of personal nothingness and submergence before the awe-inspiring object 
directly experienced.51 
We can only come to realize our own nothingness in our submergence in the awe-inspiring 
numen we experience. In arguing mysterium tremendum as an awakening, I view the 
submergence before the awe-inspiring object as mysterium tremendum. Mysterium tremendum 
enable creature consciousness. The element of awe in regards to tremor is pushing us to embrace 
the presence of the divine as opposed to deny its presence. The difference between awe and fear 
becomes how we view the experience. Fear leads us to become tentative about whatever it is that 
evoked the fear. Awe directs us to become curious and embracing, while still being surprised.  
 The Awefulness of tremor is not the only element that leads to creature consciousness. 
The element of Overpoweringness also plays a role. Awe simply has to do with the specific 
emotion. Overpoweringness is about the intensity. For this reason, Otto is able to combine both 
elements.  
It will be felt at once that there is yet a further element which must be added, that, 
namely, of “might,” “power,” “absolute overpoweringness.” We will take to 
represent this the term majestas, majesty…The tremendum may then be rendered 
more adequately tremendum majestas, or “aweful majesty.”52 
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Overpoweringness is used in combination with Awefulness to refer to the concentration of 
religious feeling. The numen is not just aweful. The numen is majestically aweful. Not only are 
we left curious and embracing about what the numen is, we are left astounded by the vastness of 
the emotion we experience.  
 This Overpoweringness is pointing to the one-sidedness of Schleiermacher’s 
feeling of dependence brought up in explaining creature consciousness: the idea that there is 
more to religious feeling than dependence. Here, Otto also uses mysticism as an example. For 
Otto, both Schleiermacher and mysticism are focused on finding the reason for dependence. 
Schleiermacher’s answer to dependence is God. Mysticism’s is an “annihilation of the self.”53 
Where Schleiermacher says that we are dependent because our existence depends on a supreme 
being, mysticism says that we are dependent because the self doesn’t exist. The problem Otto 
raises with mysticism is that “there is no thought in this of any causal relation between God, the 
creator, and the self, the creature.”54 Otto argues that the self exists; the presence of the numen is 
just so overwhelming, we realize that in comparison to its aweful majesty, we are nothing: “in 
contrast to ‘the overpowering’ of which we are conscious as an object over against the self, there 
is the feeling of one’s own submergence, of being but ‘dust and ashes’ and nothingness.”55 We 
aren’t actually dust and ashes; we are washed over by the feeling of nothingness. The awe lets us 
in on the amazement of the numen, and the majesty is the degree of the awe. If we do not exist, 
we cannot have a relationship with God.  
Mysterium tremendum is all about the relationship. Otto explains: 
The point from which speculation starts is not a “consciousness of absolute 
dependence”… it starts from a consciousness of the absolute superiority or 
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supremacy of a power other than myself, and it is only as it falls back upon 
ontological terms to achieve its end… that that element of tremendum, originally 
apprehended as “plentitude of power”, becomes transmuted into “plentitude of 
being.”56 
Otto is distinguishing his religious feeling from feelings of dependence. We do not come to find 
a divine presence through an absence of something within ourselves. We come to figure out the 
presence of the divine through experiencing a presence outside of ourselves. The idea of a 
presence is reinforced in the last aspect of the quote “plentitude of being.” Overpoweringness 
suggests an intense power felt outside of us, but Otto is talking about the intense Overpowering 
presence of the numen. The power is inherent within the presence. And because it is a presence 
we are experiencing, the experience is relational.  
 What Otto is trying to establish in his idea of religious feeling is almost the inverse of 
what others have described. Where others start with recognition of something lacking in the self 
and come to find a divine presence as a solution for the absence, Otto starts with the divine 
presence awakening the idea that we are nothing in comparison to the divine presence. A 
comparison is possible because there is a relationship between the divine and creature. In Otto, 
the idea that the self is less than the divine follows an experience of a divine presence. We 
cannot know that we are less than or nothing until we are certain of what the divine presence is. 
The divine presence is not an answer, but an experience; and I argue, an awakening.  
There is one last element of tremor and that is Energy or Urgency. Otto goes back to the 
example of God’s wrath in the Old Testament:  
It [Energy] is particularly vividly perceptible in the ópyn or “wrath”; and it 
everywhere clothes itself in symbolic expressions – vitality, passion, emotional 
temper, will, force, movement, excitement, activity, impetus. These features are 
typical and recur again and again.57 
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What is being brought out about the numen here is that it is lively. Something that contains 
passion, emotional temper, and excitement, among other things, cannot simply be a power. The 
numen is a living presence. Since it is alive and free to move of its own will, we can experience it 
over and over and over again. Yes, one can only be awakened once, however, that doesn’t mean 
we can’t experience the feeling we have been awakened to again and again. It just means we will 
be familiar with it whenever we happen to encounter it again.  
Because Energy reinforces a presence, Otto uses it to directly challenge the idea of a 
rational God in philosophy. Otto recognizes that some philosophers are challenging an 
anthropomorphic God, but also argues against their idea that God is rational. Otto says that those 
philosophers are right to shut down the idea of an anthropomorphic God, but that they are wrong 
in failing to recognize the non-rational aspect of the divine.58 The element of Energy becomes a 
crucial part of the non-rational aspect of the holy. It is the living feature of the numen outside of 
the anthropomorphic ideal. 
The last three elements we have covered, Awefulness, Overpoweringness and Energy 
only cover tremendum, half of mysterium tremendum. The living, majestically aweful numen is 
what has been presented thus far. Mysterium and the element of fascination are left. Mysterium 
has one element: the “Wholly Other.” The element of fascination serves as an element of the 
whole numinous experience.  
Before beginning to elaborate upon mysterium, Otto clarifies that although elements of 
tremendum may seem similar to mysterium, they are in fact different:  
The elements of meaning implied in “awefulness” and “mysteriousness” are in 
themselves definitely different. The latter may so far preponderate in the religious 
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in religious consciousness, may stand out so vividly, that in comparison with it 
the former almost sinks out of sight.59 
It becomes clear that mysterium is a much deeper feeling than tremendum, or at least the 
Awefulness of tremendum. To further the distinction between mysterium and tremendum, Otto 
introduces the word “stupor” in juxtaposition to tremor. “Stupor is plainly a different thing from 
tremor; it signifies blank wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, amazement absolute.”60 
Where tremor was analogous to fear, stupor is simply a dumbfounded feeling.  
 The idea of feeling dumbfounded begs the question, what are we dumbfounded about? 
What aspect of the numen leaves us with a blank wonder? This is where the “Wholly Other” 
element of mysterium is explained: “that which is ‘mysterious’ is … the ‘wholly other’, that 
which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar.”61 We already 
know that the numen exists outside of ourselves. This outside existence leads to a feeling that is 
alien or Wholly Other. This element of the numen is outside the sphere of our own imagination.   
The truly “mysterious” object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, 
not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it 
we come upon something inherently “wholly other,” whose kind and character are 
incomprehensible with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder 
that strikes a chill and numb.62 
Our knowledge and experience are limited. We can only comprehend knowledge and experience 
in relation to our form and intellect. Because the numen exists outside of both of these things, 
there is an element that is Wholly Other.  
The example Otto uses to contextualize this is a step further than a ghost story; it’s an 
actual ghost. This example helps us clarify the difference between tremor and stupor. If someone 
is telling a ghost story, there is only so much emotion one can evoke. Feeling like you are 
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encountering a ghost gives rise to a much different emotion than a story about a ghost. 
Mysterium makes sense as a more powerful feeling then tremor in this comparison. 
When Otto says that the Wholly Other raises a wonder that strikes a “chill and numb,” he 
is pointing at the ghost-likeness. More elaborately: 
The ghost’s real attraction rather consists in this, that of itself and in an 
uncommon degree it entices the imagination, awakening strong interest and 
curiosity; it is the weird thing itself that allures the fancy. But it does this, not 
because it is “something long and white” (as someone once defined a ghost), nor 
yet through any of the positive and conceptual attributes which fancies about 
ghosts have invented, but because it is a thing that “doesn’t really exist at all,” the 
“wholly other,” something which has no place in our scheme of reality but 
belongs to an absolutely different one, and which at the same time arouses an 
irrepressible interest in the mind.63                                                
Ghosts evoke strong reactions. When we think we see a ghost, our imaginations soar. Something 
outside of reality momentarily becomes real. The emotion and imagination that arise are out of 
the curiosities about whether what we have just seen was real. As Otto says, the ghost itself does 
exist, just not in our reality. The experience of “seeing” a ghost raises so many questions and sets 
our imaginations ablaze. Our minds struggle between reality and fantasy. The ghost becomes 
intriguing and leaves us wondering.   
In this analogy, the ghost is the Wholly Other. All at once the thing that doesn’t 
seemingly exist appears to exist. The numen we experience outside of ourselves is so alien that 
we react as if we had seen a ghost. Just the same as the ghost, the numen exists, but it exists in a 
different reality.   
It cannot be ignored that, like ghost stories, ghosts arouse fear. Otto addresses this with 
the element of fascination. Before expanding upon the element of fascination, we should gain an 
understanding of where this element fits into the numinous experience. By numinous experience, 
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I am taking Otto to mean our encounter with the numen, so just mysterium tremendum. He is not 
speaking to the reaction of the experience, creature consciousness, but solely the experience.  
Otto dedicates an entire chapter to the element of fascination. At the start of the chapter, 
he situates the element: 
The qualitative content of the numinous experience, to which “the mysterious” 
stands as form, is in one of its aspects the element of daunting “awefulness” and 
“majesty,” which has already been dealt with in detail; but it is clear that it has at 
the same time another aspect, in which it shows itself as something uniquely 
attractive and fascinating.64 
The form of the numinous experience lies in the mysterium. The numinous is Wholly Other. The 
content and quality of that form is brought to life by two things, the tremendum’s elements of 
Awefulness and Overpoweringness and the element of fascination. Now we know that the 
element of fascination couples with tremendum to make up the quality of the numinous 
experience.  
 In order to come to an understanding of the element of fascination Otto talks about this 
pairing that makes up the numinous experience’s content: 
These two qualities, the daunting and the fascinating, now combine in a strange 
harmony of contrasts, and the resultant dual character of the numinous 
consciousness, to which the entire religious development bears witness, at any 
rate from the level of “deamonic dread” onwards, is at once the strangest and 
most noteworthy phenomenon in the whole history of religion.65 
The elements from tremendum make up the daunting Otto speaks of. In talking about the 
daunting and the fascinating together, Otto is recognizing their differences. On the one hand, 
daunting is made up of feelings of Awefulness and Overpoweringness. The Aweful-Majesty 
evokes unexpected, overwhelming feelings. On the other hand, the fascination draws upon our 
curiosity. In one sense we cannot comprehend what it is we have experienced and on the other 
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we are totally intrigued by the feeling. This seems less like one/other and more like a both/and. 
Together, Otto names this “dual character of the numinous” a “form of ‘deamonic dread. It 
seems as though it is this specific aspect of mysterium tremendum that allows Otto to claim it as 
the “the deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious 
emotion.”66   
 “Deamonic dread” is the combining of the daunting and the fascinating, but what is it 
really? Here, the fear that was set aside in regard to the ghostliness of Wholly Other arises.  
The deamonic-divine object may appear to the mind as an object of horror and 
dread, but at the same time it is no less something that allures with a potent 
charm, and the creature, who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down, has 
always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his 
own. The “mystery” is for him not merely something to be wondered at but 
something that entrances him.67 
The fear of ghosts, or, in this case, the horror and dread of the deamonic-divine/numen, appear in 
the mind. We have already discussed at length earlier that the Awefulness of tremendum is only 
analogous to fear. So fear is to ghosts as Awefulness is to the numen. However, we are not just 
afraid of ghosts or the numinous. We, the creatures who tremble before the numen, 
simultaneously turn towards the numen. The very thing that evokes a “fear” is the thing is the 
same thing that “entrances” us. Therefore, the “deamonic dread” exists as a seemingly 
contradictory feeling. However, what I think Otto is trying to get at is that we wouldn’t be 
fascinated if we weren’t also daunted. The strong feelings we experience also ignite a 
fascination.  
 Otto calls the element of fascination “the Dionysiac-element in the numen.”68 There is 
more to fascination than the word implies. In referring to the Greek goddess Dionysus, Otto is 
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pointing to an aspect of pleasure. There is something about the numinous that leaves us wanting 
more. Can we pinpoint what it is about the experience that leaves us both satisfied and 
dissatisfied at the same time?  
Part of the reason the numinous experience is both satisfying and dissatisfying is that the 
feelings that arise can only occur through experience: “it can only be firmly grasped, thoroughly 
understood, and profoundly appreciated, purely in, with, and from the feeling itself.”69 After 
encountering the numen, we feel the greatest emotion known to religion. But it’s not only 
feelings that we gain, it’s an understanding of the numen that is clear within the experience.  The 
feelings and understanding of the numen are ephemeral. This is what makes experiencing the 
numen both satisfying and dissatisfying. In one second it is incredibly stimulating and in the 
next, it’s gone. Like any type of pleasure, I’m sure there is a rising and falling of feeling and 
understanding. The problem is that the only way to access the emotion and understanding in its 
purest and strongest form is by experiencing it, mysterium tremendum, again. This points to the 
subjectiveness and the self of the holy that will be addressed later on.   
One last thing Otto points out about fascination is that it becomes an initiator of an 
endless cycle. “Possession of and by the numen becomes an end in itself; it begins to be sought 
for its own sake.”70 Once we experience the numen, the experience becomes desired again and 
again. The experience is the end that is continually sought.  But what begins the cycle? What 
Otto doesn’t talk about is how it all begins. Here I embellish my argument that mysterium 
tremendum is an awakening.  
We can only begin to desire the numen if we have had the numinous experience, because 
the numinous experience awakens our a priori knowledge of the holy.  We know that the a priori 
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knowledge of the holy must be awoken from Otto’s statement, “as everything that comes ‘of the 
spirit’ must be awakened.”71  
One could argue that an a priori knowledge is innate and cannot require an awakening 
because it is just there. But just because something is innate does not mean we know what 
exactly it is. Think of it as if we were all inherently colorblind with the a priori knowledge of all 
color.72 If we were colorblind, what would color be? Being colorblind doesn’t limit us from 
seeing color altogether, but limits the range. Being unaware of our limited definition of color 
leads us to lack the pure experience and understanding of color. This is the same with the a 
priori knowledge of the holy. We have the ability to perceive numinous feelings, but it doesn’t 
necessarily mean we know the holy. The mysterium tremendum in the color analogy would be an 
experience of briefly experiencing all color. Until we see color, we will not ever know what 
color truly is. Until we experience mysterium tremendum, we cannot truly know what the holy is.  
Being awoken to the full experience of the holy also means that creature consciousness is 
not accessible until after we have experienced mysterium tremendum. We cannot truly know 
what we are missing until we have experienced the fullness of what exists. Just as we do not 
truly know what color is until we have seen it, the opposite is also true. We do not fully 
understand our colorblindness until we have seen color. So, we cannot fully comprehend our 
nothingness until we have experienced the numen’s aweful majesty. This point also clarifies 
what is meant by nothingness. We aren’t literally nothing. We just exist as something so much 
less than the holy. As colorblind people, we don’t see in black and white, we just don’t 
experience color in its fullness. 
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Just as it has been shown that creature consciousness precedes mysterium tremendum, I 
want to now speak to the rational aspect of the holy preceding mysterium tremendum. Otto says 
the rational is predicated upon the non-rational. “For so far are these ‘rational’ attributes from 
exhausting the idea of deity, that they in fact imply a non-rational supra-natural subject of which 
they are predicates.”73 Otto says the rational succeeds the non-rational, but classifies them both 
as a priori. If the rational succeeds the non-rational, can the rational be a priori? If creature 
consciousness is a reaction to mysterium tremendum, can it even be considered a priori? If we 
awaken to the feeling of the numen, what is it that is a priori? 
In Otto’s line of thinking, a priori incorporates reaction. Otto declares that creature 
consciousness and the rational follow mysterium tremendum. To clarify, mysterium tremendum is 
simply all the feelings that arise in the presence of the numen. Creature consciousness, the 
awareness of our nothingness, and the rational, the knowledge of the deity’s attributes, follow. 
This means that not only is the feeling of the numen instinctual, but the reactions to those 
feelings are also imbedded within us.  We know this to be true because Otto’s holy is classified 
as a priori. That applies the rational and non-rational equally.  
In arguing mysterium tremendum as an awakening, I am simultaneously challenging 
Otto’s definition of a priori. If a priori is an inherent knowledge, how can a reaction be 
considered a priori? Something that is inherent cannot also be reactive. It would mean that what 
is a priori is simultaneously a posteriori, especially because we are strictly speaking about 
knowledge. The knowledge gained from mysterium tremendum enables the knowledge of 
creature consciousness.   
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Setting aside the problems that may arise from a dichotomy, we can see that Otto’s idea 
of a priori contradicts his idea of subjectivity. Otto’s idea of subjectivity is not spoken to as a big 
idea by Otto, but is an important idea within his work. Otto’s idea of subjectivity is that we all 
come to know the numen in the ways of our own mind: “He must be guided and led on by 
consideration and discussion of the matter through the ways of his own mind.”74 What is 
subjective are the ways we come to know the numen.75 We must all come to find the numen in 
individual ways. Coming to find the numen in individual ways assumes we are individuals. 
 Although we are individuals and come to find the numen subjectively, the numen itself is 
objective. We all end up at the same thing, the numen. The ways in which we get there are all 
completely different. This idea will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2, but I’m bringing it up now 
to say that this idea contradicts his definition of a priori. Otto’s idea of a priori includes 
objective reaction to the numen. If we come to find the numen and ultimately the holy 
subjectively, it means that we all have a different relationship to the holy. The holy in and of 
itself exists as one thing, but we each relate to that one thing in our own way. This is true of 
human relations. We are one person, but have many different relationships with many different 
people. I see Otto assuming we all have the same relationship with the holy by incorporating 
reactive knowledge in his idea of a priori.  
 Assuming we are all going to react and come to the same conclusions about the holy 
after encountering mysterium tremendum is assuming that we all have the same relationship with 
the holy. Otto knows that this isn’t true. In fact, his idea of the holy is fundamentally rooted in 
his idea of subjectiveness. It seems crucial to distinguish between the holy and our relationship to 
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the holy. The holy is objective. It is an objective thing we come to understand subjectively. This 
subjective way of understanding does not allow for the existence of a model relationship with the 
holy. Just because the holy is objective does not mean its relationships are also objective.  
I have argued that Otto’s definition of a priori, incorporating reactive knowledge, 
contradicts his own idea of subjectiveness. If I have been successful, it means that the argument 
contingent upon it can be made: that mysterium tremendum is the awakening of a priori 
knowledge and that creature consciousness and the rational aspect of the holy are not a priori.  
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Chapter 2- The Passive Soul: Relocating Individuality 
We have examined the a priori view of the holy and the rational and non-rational aspects, 
but there are still a few facets of Otto’s approach to theorizing religion that have yet to be 
elaborated. Many of the ideas set aside for further discussion in chapter 1 involve Otto’s idea of 
self and will be explored here. The goal of this chapter is to establish and problematize Otto’s 
dichotomy of the self, spirit and soul. I will argue against the necessity of the soul through an 
inconsistency between Otto’s definition of individuality and Otto’s definition of soul. This 
chapter also aims to connect spirit and soul with rational and non-rational.  
From what we have already discussed, we know that Otto’s self is a creature and has a 
mind. In chapter 1, I clarified that Otto isn’t talking about the senses when he uses the word 
feelings: “these feelings can only arise in the mind as accompanying emotions when the category 
of ‘the numinous’ is called into play.”76 The feelings, such as “creature consciousness” and 
mysterium tremendum, which inform us of the numinous’s presence, arise in the mind. By “us,” I 
mean creatures. In Otto’s approach to theorizing religion, we are creatures. This was established 
in his definition of “creature consciousness”: “It is the emotion of a creature, submerged and 
overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.”77 
Feelings such as “creature consciousness” that arise in the mind arise in the mind of creatures.  
All of this is very vague. The creature could exist as the mind. The creature could exist as 
something else and have a mind. We are urged away from thinking about the self as a body, 
although we have not really been given an alternative. From what I have explained thus far, the 
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self is a creature that is able to perceive feelings through a mind. What that mind is to the 
creature has yet to be disclosed, not to mention what the creature consists of.   
 In appendix IV of The Idea of the Holy, Otto gives a brief explanation of the self: “Now 
what is true of our apprehension of the divine is true also of its counterpart in the creature – soul 
and spirit.”78 By “apprehension of the divine,” Otto means the rational and non-rational aspects 
of the holy. He has just gotten done summarizing all we have already discussed, that the rational 
and non-rational exist together as the holy. He is pushing this further to explain that we, the 
creatures, are microcosms of the holy. More specifically, we are interested in regarding the 
microcosm as what the rational and non-rational are within the creature. The rational and non-
rational features of the holy become spirit and soul for the creature. The self as a microcosm of 
the holy will be elaborated on toward the conclusion of this chapter and further in chapter 3. 
In order to make sense of what the mind is in relation to the self, we must address what 
spirit and soul are. Otto does not elaborate upon what he means by spirit and soul in appendix 
IV. In the whole of The Idea of the Holy, the only other time Otto mentions spirit and soul in this 
context is in appendix V. Spirit is mentioned in the last page before the appendix, however. It is 
capitalized and I take it to refer to the Holy Spirit. Outside of the creature context, Otto reveals a 
different meaning of spirit and soul when he speaks to the ghost-like creatures we refer to when 
trying to explain phenomena. Now, I look to Naturalism and Religion for an explanation of the 
intricacies of self. For it is there where Otto has clarified its definition and distinction.  
Before elaborating upon soul and spirit, it is important to note that Otto comes to define 
and expand upon them near the end of Naturalism and Religion. Otto spends the majority of the 
book presenting different theories of naturalism and arguing their failure to incorporate religion. 
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Soul and spirit come out of the relationship between naturalism and religion Otto established 
many pages earlier. Because of this, the established relationship between naturalism and religion 
will be used to help guide our understanding of soul and spirit, and, therefore, also mind and 
body. 
Otto defines soul and spirit in chapter XI,  “Freedom of Spirit.” Soul is explained first 
within the section “Individuality.” 
It is true that the ‘soul’ does not spring up ready-made in the developing body, 
lying dormant in it, and only requiring to waken up gradually. It really becomes. 
But the becoming is a self-realisation. It is not true that it is put together and built 
up bit by bit by experience, so that a different being might develop if the 
experiences were different…A man may turn out very different according to 
circumstances, education, influences. But he would nevertheless recognise 
‘himself’ under any circumstances. He will never become anything of which he 
had not the possibility within him from the very beginning, any more than the 
rose will become a violet if it is nurtured with a different kind of manure.79 
The soul is something that is established through our experiences. We can never become 
something other than our soul. The analogy of the rose is very helpful. No matter how you care 
for a rose, it will never turn into a different flower. A rose may get different amounts of sunlight 
and water, but at no point will it fail to be a rose. The rose’s experience does not alter the fact 
that it is a rose. Even if it doesn’t fully bloom, it is still a rose.  
 If we alter the rose analogy, we can use it to make sense of how Otto views the body. In 
creating a second slightly different analogy than Otto’s, I am not only introducing Otto’s view of 
the body, but also trying to steer us away from thinking of the soul in a tangible way. Otto uses 
the analogy to help us think about what the soul is, but I feel that it is important to distinguish the 
difference between body and soul. Otto’s view on the body will be expanded upon later. 
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Otto has many problems with the body, one of which involves individuality. This is 
exposed in chapter V, “Religion and Theory of Descent,” of Naturalism and Religion when Otto 
is addressing the issue with descent. 
The most oppressive corollary of the doctrine of descent is undoubtedly that 
through it the human race seems to become lost in the infra-human, from which it 
cannot be separated by any hard and fast boundaries, or absolute lines of 
demarcation.80 
Otto’s argument against bodies is the unity of the human race. Because we are all human, we are 
not individuals. We are lesser than human because we are a collective group. In Otto’s rose 
analogy, all of our souls are different flowers. The essence of the soul is not its embodiment; it is 
our predetermined individuality.  
For the sake of explaining Otto’s view of the body, consider a rosebush instead of a 
single rose. Also, instead of the roses being soul, think of them now as bodies. If we are seeing 
the roses as bodies, their individuality escapes the tangible essence of the rose. If our bodies are 
roses, our souls are not our rose nature, but an internal predetermined individuality.  
 If we go back to the first chapter’s discussion about subjectivity, this idea of individuality 
is wound up in that idea. Otto’s idea of subjectivity in relation to the holy is that we, individual 
creatures, awaken to the holy “in the ways of his [our] own mind.”81 Individuality is important to 
Otto’s self in relation to the holy because it is a creature’s individuality that enables it to 
establish a relationship with the holy. We are only able to be subjective, have ways of our own 
mind, because we are all different. Otto’s idea of the holy doesn’t make sense unless the creature 
is an individual.  
 If Otto does not see the body within the scope of individuality, what is a creature’s 
essence? Is it the mind? Isn’t the mind part of the body? In the quote earlier defining soul, Otto 
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said that a soul “really becomes.” “Become” is a key verb for Otto. It is contrasted with being. 
Being and becoming are distinguished in the second chapter of Naturalism and Religion entitled 
“Naturalism.”  
Being and Becoming include two great realms: that of “Nature” and that of 
“Mind,” i.e. consciousness and the processes of consciousness. And two 
apparently fundamentally different branches of knowledge relate to these: the 
natural sciences, and the mental sciences.82 
Being is connected to nature and consciousness and becoming connected to the mind and the 
process of consciousness. In the original quote given to define soul, Otto says, “the ‘soul’ does 
not spring up ready-made in the developing body,”83 so we know that the body is not the soul’s 
essence because of its lack of individuality.  
In order to come to an understanding about what Otto’s view of the essence of the self is 
in relation to being and becoming and the mind, we must understand how Otto defines 
naturalism and religion. Naturalism is most simply defined by Otto when he describes its main 
goals: “Naturalism is proud of the fact that it desires nothing more than to search after truth.”84 
From this we can comprehend that naturalism aims to explain things and classify them as truths. 
But what are the “things” naturalism is trying to explain and classify as truth? “The fundamental 
convictions of naturalism, its general tendencies, and the points of view which determine its 
outlook, are primarily related to that order of facts which forms the subject of the natural 
sciences, to ‘Nature.’”85 The “things” naturalism seeks to claim invoke nature and natural 
science, plants, animals, astrology, etc, just as the name suggests.  
In turning to Otto’s definition of religion, we can see its opposition to naturalism: “For 
this is the most real characteristic of religion; it seeks depth in things, reaches out towards what 
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is concealed, uncomprehended, and mysterious. It is more than humility; it is piety. And piety is 
experience of mystery.”86 Religion seeks depth and relishes mystery. Otto goes as far as saying 
that religion is piety and then defines piety as the “experience of mystery.” Religion becomes 
defined, indirectly, as the experience of mystery. There is a question that arises in religions 
opposing definition to naturalism: what is truth in the context of mystery? I am noting naturalism 
and religion’s opposing definition, but will address it in chapter 3. 
Since we understand what Otto means by naturalism and religion, we can use his 
distinction between religious creatures and natural animals to localize the mind and introduce the 
spirit. 
 We get the distinction between human and animal in the section in chapter XI of 
Naturalism and Religion entitled “Mind and Spirit. The Human and the Animal Soul.”  
What is the relation between the human and the animal mind? This has always 
been a vital question in the conflict between naturalism and the religious outlook. 
And as in the whole problem of the psychical so here the interest on both sides 
has been mainly concentrated on the question of “mortality” or “immortality.” 
Man is immortal because he has a soul. Animals “have no souls.” “Animals also 
have souls, differing only in degree but not in substantial nature from the soul of 
man: as they are mortal, man must be so too.” “Animals have minds: the merely 
psychical passes away with the body. But man has spirit in addition. It is 
imperishable.” These and many other assertions were made on one side or the 
other. And both sides made precisely  the same mistake: they made the belief in 
the immortality of our true nature dependent upon a proof that the soul has a 
physical “substantial nature,” which is to be regarded as an indestructible 
substance, a kind of spiritual atom. And on the other hand they overlooked the 
gist of the whole matter, the true starting-point, which cannot be overlooked if the 
religious outlook is not to be brought into discredit.87  
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Otto quotes a “conversation” between naturalism and religion about the difference between 
animals and humans.88 The conversation points to the difficulty in distinguishing the difference 
between the two. What religion is arguing for the human, naturalism is also arguing about the 
animal. The argument is seemingly impossible, however Otto approaches it through a flaw both 
contain. Their flaw: “they made the belief in the immortality of our true nature dependent upon a 
proof that the soul has a physical ‘substantial nature,’ which is to be regarded as an indestructible 
substance.”89 Their flaw lies within the belief that the soul has a physical essence.   
 This flaw advances Otto’s argument about the body we discussed earlier regarding 
descent. We previously arrived at how humans can’t be embodied because the human race leaves 
no room for individuality. Here, not only are bodies universal within the human race, animals 
also share embodiment, even if in a different form. For Otto, embodiment is part of nature.  
 After establishing Otto views bodies as part of nature, the question of essence and 
localization emerge. What are creatures if not embodied? Although he doesn’t address the 
localization, Otto proposes an alternative essence.   
It is undoubtedly a fundamental postulate, and one which the religious outlook 
cannot give up, that the human spirit is more than all creatures, and is in quite a 
different order from stars, plants, and animals. But absolutely the first necessity 
from the point of view of the religious outlook is to establish the incomparable 
value of the human spirit; the question of its “substantial nature” is in itself a 
matter of entire indifference. The religious outlook observes that man can will 
good and can pray, and no other creature can do this. And it sees that this makes 
the difference between two worlds. Whether the bodily and mental physics in 
both these worlds is the same or different, is to it a matter rather of curiosity than 
of importance.90 
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He claims that we are spirit.91 Because humans/creatures have a spirit, they are above all other 
embodied creatures. It is not our body, but our spirit that make us religious beings. “It is 
undoubtedly a fundamental postulate, and one which the religious outlook cannot give up, that 
the human spirit is more than all creatures, and is in quite a different order from stars, plants, and 
animals.”92 What sets humans apart as religious is their spirit.  
Otto also establishes that the spirit is an unquestionable element of religion: “But 
absolutely the first necessity from the point of view of the religious outlook is to establish the 
incomparable value of the human spirit”93 What makes everything else not religious and 
therefore part of nature, is their lack of a spirit. Without a spirit, everything else is incomparable.  
 What exactly does that make the human spirit? “The religious outlook observes that man 
can will good and can pray, and no other creature can do this.”94 What makes humans religious, 
obtainers of spirit is an ability no other embodied being has. Humans can “pray and will good.” 
More than that, Otto later goes on to distinguish the difference between training and educating. 
He says, “I can train a young ape or an elephant, can teach it to open wine-bottles and perform 
tricks. But I can educate the child of the savage.”95 Animals can be taught how to perform 
repeated actions. Humans, on the other hand, can be taught, educated and apply what they have 
learned elsewhere. Humans are able to perform tasks from their individual knowledge. The spirit 
becomes defined as ability.  
                                                        
91 In the quote regarding human and animal distinction, Otto uses the term “creature,” however; 
we must remember that this quote is from Naturalism and Religion. The meaning of creature 
within the context “that the human spirit is more than all creatures,” is not the same creature 
from Otto’s Idea of the Holy. What creature means here is all other embodied beings, animals, 
plants and even stars. The human spirit here is the same as the creature’s spirit in regards to the 
idea of the holy. Otto’s human in Naturalism and Religion is his creature in The Idea of the Holy.  
92 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 145. 
93 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 145. 
94 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 145. 
95 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 146. 
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 The only thing enabling our ability seems to be the divine. “Whether the bodily and 
mental physics in both these worlds is the same or different, is to it a matter rather of curiosity 
than of importance”96 The two worlds are the animal and the human. Otto is saying here that it 
doesn’t matter what the body or mind is, all that matters is that a spirit exists. Otto is failing to 
localize the spirit here, however, we will come to understand how he localizes the spirit in 
chapter 3.  
In coming to understand what Otto means when he says nature through body and spirit, 
we can apply it to the discussion of being and becoming, which is ultimately the discussion of 
the soul. Looking back, being and becoming were connected with nature and mind. Since we 
now know that Otto views the body as part of nature we can view being and becoming as mind 
and body.  
Knowing this, we can make sense of the soul’s definition: “It [the soul] really 
becomes.”97 Looking back at the quote about being and becoming, we can locate the soul. 
Being and Becoming include two great realms: that of ‘Nature’ and that of 
‘Mind,’ i.e. consciousness and the processes of consciousness. And two 
apparently fundamentally different branches of knowledge relate to these: the 
natural sciences, and the mental sciences.98 
If the soul becomes, it is within the realm of the mind, which also connects it with the process of 
consciousness and mental sciences. It is clear that the soul is associated with the mind. Whether 
the soul is within or of the mind makes no difference. If the soul is associated with the mind, we 
can say that it is localized there because we know we will find the soul where we find the mind.  
 We already clarified that the soul is a predetermined individuality and that spirit is a sort 
of ability. Here, Otto distinguishes spirit and soul:  
                                                        
96 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 145. 
97  Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 144. 
98 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 15. 
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And in the development of the mental content the “soul” itself is merely the stage 
upon which all that is acquired through the senses crowds, and jostles, and unites 
to form images, perceptions, and precepts. But it is itself purely passive, and it 
becomes what happens to it. Therefore it is not really spirit at all, for spirit implies 
spontaneity, activity, and autonomy. 99 
This established separation brings me back to how the self is a microcosm of the holy in that soul 
and spirit translate to rational and non-rational. In the quote above, Otto says the soul is passive, 
“it [the soul] is itself purely passive.” The soul’s passivity leads it to “become what happens to 
it.” We know that the soul is connected to the mind, so Otto is also saying the mind is passive. 
This passivity of soul and mind mean they are dependent upon action. How do mind and soul 
experience anything if they are passive? They cannot exist alone. Otto answers this in regard to 
soul in saying the spirit implies activity. However, Otto fails to address what this means in 
relation to the mind because he has not clearly localized the spirit.  
Just as I redefined the a priori last chapter to exclude the rational, here I want to redefine 
the self to exclude soul. Specifically, I want to argue that the soul is not what makes creatures 
individuals. Otto defined the soul as both individual and as passive. If the soul is passive, always 
receiving action, how can it be consistent as an individual? Something that depends on another 
thing in order to exist cannot be an individual. The soul is dependent upon the independent spirit. 
It passively awaits the ability of the spirit.  
Since I have already argued that individuality is crucial to Otto’s idea of subjectivity, I’m 
not arguing that the self is not an individual. What I am arguing is that the spirit is what makes 
the self an individual. Something that is dependent relies on the individuality of the thing it is 
dependent upon in order to become. Think of it in relation to clothes trends. Say the latest trend 
                                                        
99 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 127. 
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is to wear Doc Martens shoes.100 Buying Doc Martens because they are trendy is very different 
from buying Doc Martens because you really love how they look and wear. Buying Doc Martens 
because they are trendy is an action dependent upon someone else’s opinion and/or action. I am 
arguing that we fail to be individuals when we act in this manner. We literally buy into a 
collective image when we buy name-brand clothes.  
Conversely, if we buy Doc Martens because we love how they look, feel they are really 
comfortable, and fit into our overall image, we are acting individually. This becomes an act of 
self-investment. I’m not saying everyone who wears Doc Martens or name-brand clothing fails 
to be an individual. The name brands had to have started from an individual or many individuals’ 
love of the popular item. The point is the question, what drives us to act? That passive waiting 
for something outside of ourselves makes us dependent and therefore less of an individual. That 
taking action from a place of relating to and really enjoying something is direct and individual.  
 Through this analogy I am trying to say that the soul is wearing Doc Martens because the 
spirit started a trend. Something that is independent does not need anything to make a decision. 
The spirit does not need the soul. The spirit is the trendsetter, the one who is wearing Doc 
Martens because they fit into who/what the spirit is. The spirit consistently acts individually, 
while the soul waits in order to buy into exactly what the spirit has deemed worth buying into.  
Where does religion play into this analogy? In order to answer this, I want to point back 
to and elaborate on the discussion about individuality’s connection to subjectivity. We said 
earlier that creatures must be individuals in order to move subjectively. We know this because 
the creature’s ability to be subjective enables it to come to the numen. Arguing the spirit as 
individual further connects individuality and subjectivity. Otto said, “The first necessity from the 
                                                        
100 If you are unfamiliar with Doc Martens, know it is a name-brand shoe. The example goes for 
anything name brand that is trendy, i.e. Uggs, The North Face, Apple, Ray Bans, Nike etc. 
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point of view of the religious outlook is to establish the incomparable value of the human 
spirit.”101 Otto is saying that it is a necessity for religion to establish the human spirit. Not only 
was this not claimed about the soul, but also with spirit now inclusive to individuality, it aligns 
with his view of the significance of subjectivity. If we restrict the creature self to an individual 
spirit, we are not restricting it at all. We, creatures, are still able to come to the numen in 
subjective ways.  
The existence of the soul is yet another flaw of a dichotomy, which I will come to explain 
as stressing the rational in chapter 3. For now, I will leave my argument alone as simply a 
deconstruction of why the soul does not belong in the religious realm. chapter 3’s discussion 
addresses the cause of these rational stresses, which keep emerging. 
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Chapter 3 – The Mechanized Body: Establishing Naturalism 
We discussed in chapter 2 how soul and spirit connect to rational and non-rational in The 
Idea of the Holy and that in both, there is an unnecessary stress on one side of the dichotomy. 
Also in both, we saw how the stress was problematic. In this chapter, after showing that Otto 
localizes the self in the mind, I will argue that Otto’s inconsistent use of naturalism raises issue 
with the localization of the mind. This argument becomes one for the localization of the body.  
Since the dichotomy body and mind is the localization of the dichotomy soul and spirit, 
much of the body and mind dichotomy has already been introduced. Likewise, soul and spirit 
will be used to inform body and mind. In order to explain Otto’s body and mind dichotomy, we 
must work within his parameters. For the time being, when I refer to the self, although I treated it 
in chapter 2, I am speaking to Otto’s untreated self.   
It was established in chapter 2 that the soul, defined by Otto as predetermined 
individuality, is localized in the mind. We established this through its connection to becoming. 
Although ambiguous, spirit was addressed in Otto’s distinction between humans and animals. 
The spirit’s localization is inconclusive because Otto defines it outside of localization. I cannot 
claim Otto is localizing the self in the body or mind from what we have already discussed 
because the two aspects of the self don’t align. Otto’s localized self will be clearer after we 
address the inconclusive localization of the spirit.  
 The block quote defining spirit, which also distinguished animals and humans, concerns 
Otto’s ambiguous location of the spirit. 
The religious outlook observes that man can will good and can pray, and no other 
creature can do this. And it sees that this makes the difference between two 
worlds. Whether the bodily and mental physics in both these worlds is the same or 
different, is to it a matter rather of curiosity than of importance.102 
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Again, Otto is saying here that it doesn’t matter what the body or mind is, all that matters is that 
a spirit exists. As we discussed, Otto views the spirit as ability. If the spirit is ability, what is it 
that is able? Is the spirit both ability and the thing that is able? If the spirit is separate from the 
mind, does the self exist as two separate things? If this were the case we would fail to be a self. 
We would consist of selves.  
Ultimately, we are speaking to the Idea of the Holy. We are trying to figure out how the 
self, within the idea of holy, is localized through Naturalism and Religion. Otto wrote 
Naturalism and Religion before The Idea of the Holy. This means that the self in the Idea of the 
Holy, although scarcely addressed, is more developed. For all of these reasons, I turn to The Idea 
of the Holy to answer the ambiguity of spirit’s localization.  
In The Idea of the Holy Otto consistently refers to the mind as it relates to self. In fact, it 
is one of the only, if not the only, other words Otto uses besides creature to refer to the self. The 
consistent language of the mind in The Idea of the Holy coupled with Otto’s indistinct location of 
spirit leads us to assume Otto localizes the self, spirit and soul, in the mind. Above all, we know 
that Otto’s spirit is not of the body and nothing outside of the mind has been proposed, so the 
mind is a safe assumption. Even if we were to leave Otto’s self ambiguously localized, it would 
not distract from my argument.  
If Otto localizes the self in the mind, or if it remains ambiguous, what does he think about 
the body? Why doesn’t he include the body? Chapter 2 addressed one reason Otto has with the 
body and that is individuality. The collective human race, the idea that we all have the same 
body, does not bode well with Otto’s idea of individuality. This is not the only problem Otto has 
with bodies. The other problem Otto has with bodies relates to naturalism. In order to understand 
it, we must understand how Otto relates naturalism and religion.  
  
51 
  It was established that Otto defines naturalism as the explaining of nature and religion as 
the experience of mystery; and that these definitions oppose each other. Before we concentrate 
on how Otto establishes naturalism and religion’s relationship, his specific issues with naturalism 
must be addressed.  
For Otto, naturalism does not incorporate religion because it reduces nature. “Religion 
comes into contact with naturalism and demands to be reconciled with it, not merely at its 
periphery, but at its very core, namely, with its characteristic ideal of a mathematical-mechanical 
interpretation of the whole world.”103 The problem with naturalism is that it leaves no room for 
questions, mystery, and phenomenon. It leaves no room for religion. Everything about the world, 
from the point of view of naturalism, is mechanized. Everything that is unknown in religion has 
an explanation in naturalism. A question that then arises is: what is truth in the context of 
mystery? The only thing that can be true in religion is the mystery.  
Outside of naturalism’s exclusion of mystery, Otto argues that naturalism’s reduction of 
nature makes it independent. This is an issue because “The ‘dependence’ of all things is the 
second requirement of religion.”104 Otto is referring to Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence 
when he says “dependence.” As we discussed last chapter, it is the feeling of dependence upon 
God.105 Religion is contingent upon a divine other. Naturalism’s independence leads Otto to 
question it. If naturalism had answers, it should be able to address his questions. Otto questions 
and questions and questions naturalism until he reaches the eschatological question: “How, from 
                                                        
103 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 17. 
104 Otto, Naturalism and Religion, 25. 
105 Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence translates to Otto’s creature consciousness: the 
creature feeling nothing in the presence of the numen. Although Otto’s critique of naturalism 
does not deal with the issues of Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence, the differences do not 
affect the argument. The argument is that religion depends on the divine. Both the feeling of 
dependence and creature consciousness depend on the divine, just in different respects. 
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all this homogeneity and unity of the ultimate particles and forces, can we account for the 
beginnings of the diversity which is so marked a characteristic of this world?”106 Otto is 
questioning how nature created itself. Even if naturalism has an answer, Otto poses other 
questions about the creation of space and time, arguing that religion challenges them as concepts. 
His point is, that by reducing nature to cause and effect explanations, big questions are getting 
postponed and, therefore, never truly get addressed.   
The reductionist tendencies of naturalism leave no room for religion, so how does Otto 
incorporate it into religion? In order to incorporate naturalism into religion, Otto has to redefine 
naturalism. “Even the world, which has been brought under the reign of scientific laws, is a 
mystery; it has been formulated, but not explained.”107 Otto chooses to view naturalism’s truths 
as laws. The difference between law and truth is a difference between formulating and 
explaining. Explaining is stating a cause. Formulating is proposing an idea. It is also clear if we 
say explaining is to solution as formulating is to strategy. Strategy and formula leave room for 
religion because they do not reduce nature to cause and effects. We have already established that 
explaining, which is reducing, does not coincide with religion.  
In turning naturalism’s truth into laws, Otto is simultaneously making room for mystery 
and disposing of reductionism. Otto is able to make the claim, “If religion is true, nature must be 
of God, and it must bear tokens which allow us to interpret it as of God.”108 The relationship of 
naturalism and religion becomes one of God.  
If we turn back to Otto’s view of the body, we can see his problem with it, in relation to 
naturalism, in a counter argument.  
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Even if we admit that it [religious experience] can only become actual and 
develop as an accompaniment of processes within bodies, and only within those 
bodies we call “living,” and that wherever bodies exist psychical phenomena 
occur; even if we were able, as we never shall be able, to produce living beings 
artificially in a retort, and even if psychical phenomena occurred in these also, we 
should still have made no progress towards explaining what the psychical really 
is.109 
Otto poses the idea of replicating bodies. If something can be replicated, we know exactly how it 
came about and know exactly what we need to recreate it. I am envisioning an assembly like 
workers putting together robots. Concisely, something that can be replicated is something that 
can be explained. Lest we forget, in chapter 2, we established that bodies are included in the 
realm of the natural. So, something that can be explained is something that is naturalistic. Otto’s 
second opposition to the body is a naturalistic opposition. That it is outside of mystery.  
 Otto’s arguments against the body are that the human race deprives us of individuality 
and that the body is naturalistic. I am going to argue that Otto’s self is really meant to be 
localizes in the body. I will start with the argument against the naturalistic approach.  
 The problem with Otto stating the body is naturalistic is that he is assuming we know 
everything about the body. Otto addresses this argument himself in the relationship we described 
between religion and naturalism, but he is failing to apply it to the localization of the self. 
Viewing naturalism as laws opposed to truths allows nature to exist as religious. Seeing the body 
as not completely known would make it within the religious. I see Otto pointing to this but not 
being able to express it. He gets at this when he claims bodies cannot be replicated just after he 
claims that they can. The body is being mechanized and naturalism is being pushed back to its 
previous definition of reduction that Otto has already treated. 
 Otto’s problem with individuality, that the human race does not allow us to be 
individuals, relates back to Otto’s idea in chapter 2 that creatures are microcosms of the holy. We 
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have already established that creatures are microcosms because soul and spirit mirror rational 
and non-rational. The terms microcosm and macrocosm imply both difference and similarity. If, 
for Otto, creatures are the mind, I mean his non-physical mind, the question arises: what is the 
difference between the microcosm and the macrocosm? How could we delineate between 
microcosm and macrocosm if their essence was not established? We must be embodied being in 
order to distinguish ourselves as other.  
 If I argue this, the question becomes, how do you distinguish individuality between 
creatures? Otto has already dealt with this through his idea of subjectivity. Creatures are 
subjective in the ways they come to find the numen, in the “ways of their own mind.” In the 
treated version, “in the ways of our own bodies.” Because we have changed the self to be body 
instead of mind, the subjectivity is not on how we perceive feelings emotionally, but bodily. Otto 
defines this in the Idea of the Holy through what he says about music. “Musical feeling is rather 
(like numinious feeilng) something ‘wholly other,’ which, while it affords analogies and here 
and there will run parallel to the ordinary emotions of life, cannot be made to coincide with them 
by detailed point-to point correspondence.”110 Music is more than just a feeling. Music that really 
speaks to someone evokes an emotion that is Wholly Other.  
 As we discussed in chapter 1, the Wholly Other is one of the deepest religious emotions 
one can feel. What helps us understand the subjectivemenss of bodies through the Wholly Other 
feeling evoked by music is its ability to corresponds to memories. The specific example I’m 
thinking of is dementia patients who have trouble connecting with the world. It has been shown 
that if you find the right music to play, a song that may have correlated with a certain memory or 
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Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1958), 49. 
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emotion, their demeanor immediately changes. Bodies that remember feelings from other 
feelings, vibrations of music, how can we ever come to understand that?  
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Conclusion 
 In this project, we have looked at Otto’s rational and non-rational, soul and spirit and 
body and mind dichotomies. The mind proved problematic from Otto’s inconsistent use of 
naturalism, the soul was an issue regarding individuality, and the rational didn’t seem to match 
up with a priori. Otto’s treated idea of the holy then consists of an a priori non-rational, the 
individual spirit and divine filled body.  
 If the numen is non-rational and manifests as a divine presence, which evokes feeling, 
and the creature is an embodied spirit, which perceives feeling, what does that make the holy? I 
guess that makes the holy a relationship between creature and numen, but we’ve already proven 
the mystery cannot be defined. That’s what is so amazing about Otto, that every embodied 
creature has the ability to experience something divine and we have absolutely no idea what 
exactly that means.  
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